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"And homeless near a thousand homes I stood,
And near a thousand tables pined and wanted food."
William Wordsworth (1770-1850)1
The homeless2 in America lead terribly hard lives. Our prosperous na-
tion has, for most of its existence, failed to provide decent housing for
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1. WILLIAM WORDSWORTH, Guilt and Sorrow or Incidents upon Salisbury Plain,
reprinted in THE WORKS OF WILLIAM WORDSWORTH 31, 43 (Black's Readers
Serv. Co. ed., Random House, Inc. 1951) (1794).
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 11302(a) (2000).
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many of its people.3 Because the homeless often lack reliable transporta-
tion to stores, medical care, work, schools, government aid, and training
programs, worthwhile housing must be located near work, medical facili-
ties, schools, shopping, and government offices.4 It is precisely those ar-
eas, however, that are often zoned for business, industrial, commercial,
single-family, suburban, or other uses barring residential housing facilities
that could provide the homeless with safe, affordable and decent hous-
ing.5 In other words, the homeless need safe, affordable housing pre-
cisely where local governments often ban such housing. It is an absurd
Catch 22.6
Federal and local governments have consistently ignored the need to
provide adequate housing for the homeless.7 It is obvious that private,
for-profit organizations are rarely interested in providing safe, decent and
affordable housing for the homeless, who cannot afford to pay standard
commercial rates for housing.8 If there is a solution for the homeless
problem, it rests with non-profit entities and corporations, which can af-
ford to provide such housing for free or for rates so low they would
promptly bankrupt for-profit corporations. After all, taxes impose a bur-
den on any profit-based organization. The ability of non-profit organiza-
tions to operate tax-free is a tremendous benefit in providing such
housing for free, or for very reasonable and affordable rates - if the non-
profit must charge tenants at all.
The term "homeless" in this article includes persons who have no place to live, as well as
people who are living in structures, motor vehicles, or other places that are unfit for safe,
decent, long-term human habitation. This approach is analogous to the federal govern-
ment's definition of "homeless" or "homeless individual or homeless person." Id.
3. See generally TED GOTrFRIED, HOMELESSNESS: WHOSE PROBLEM IS IT? (1999);
HOMELESSNESS: A GUIDE TO THE LITERATURE (B. G. Kutais & Tatiana Shohov eds.,
1999); KENNETH L. KUSMER, DowN AND OUT, ON THE ROAD: THE HOMELESS IN AMERI-
CAN HISTORY (2002); PETER H. Rossi, DOWN AND OUT IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF
HOMELESSNESS (1989).
4. See GOTTFRIED, supra note 3, at 65-66.
5. See generally GOTTFRIED, supra note 3; HOMELESSNESS: A GUIDE TO THE LITERA-
TURE, supra note 3; KUSMER, supra note 3; Rossi, supra note 3.
6. Stuard v. Steward, 401 F.3d 1064, 1067 n.8 (9th Cir. 2005) ("In Joseph Heller's
World War II novel, Yossarian tries to avoid having to fly any more dangerous combat
missions by claiming that he is crazy. The doctor explains to him that only a crazy person
would willingly fly combat missions after a lot of close calls, but rational concern for his
own safety proves that a person is not crazy. So, anyone who asks to be relieved from
flying more combat missions because he is crazy can't be relieved, since his rational request
proves he isn't crazy. 'That's some catch, that Catch-22,' acknowledges Yossarian. Joseph
Heller, Catch-22 at 46-47 (Dell ed., 1962) (1955).").
7. See generally GOTTFRIED, supra note 3; HOMELESSNESS: A GUIDE TO THE LITERA-
TURE, supra note 3; KUSMER, supra note 3; Rossi, supra note 3.
8. See GOTTFRIED, supra note 3, at 89-90 (discussing the obstacles faced by developers
who do wish to provide affordable housing to the homeless).
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Among non-profit groups, religious organizations have a potentially
priceless advantage. If providing housing for the homeless is an exercise
of religion, such religious organizations can assert the applicability of con-
stitutional doctrines and statutes that may enable them to provide hous-
ing for large numbers of the homeless, in locations where such housing
can do the most good.9
Religious organizations that want to provide safe and affordable hous-
ing for the homeless, as a concrete expression and exercise of religious
faith, have two very powerful tools they can use to place such housing
and services in places where they will be most effective, despite contrary
local zoning and land use laws. The first tool is the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution, which is a general prohibition against
making laws prohibiting the free exercise of religion."0 The second tool is
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000.1 For
ease of reference, this law will generally be referred to as the "Religious
Land Use Act" or as "RLUIPA."
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
In relevant part, the First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free ex-
ercise thereof.12 This provides the starting point for any challenge to land
use or zoning laws banning a religious organization from using property
to house the homeless. While federal laws come and go at congressional
whim, and are occasionally declared unconstitutional, the First Amend-
ment is an integral part of the United States Constitution, and is the foun-
dation for establishing the limits of the free exercise of religion in the
United States.
American courts have repeatedly recognized that providing housing
and other essential services for the homeless and disadvantaged are forms
of religious activity and worship.13 In order to claim the First Amend-
9. See Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, 293 F.3d 570, 574 (2d Cir.
2002) (suggesting how to provide housing).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
11. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000cc-2000cc-5 (2000).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
13. See, e.g., Capital City Rescue Mission v. City of Albany Bd. of Zoning Appeals,
652 N.Y.S.2d 388, 390 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). ("Here, it is not disputed that petitioner's
functions are not for profit. Its mission statement also reflects its religious status. The
proposed uses of the facility include providing food, clothing, shelter, counseling, medical
care, educational training and spiritual guidance to disadvantaged individuals. Even if we
accepted respondent's conclusion that these activities did not fall within the definition of a
house of worship, we fail to see how they do not comport with the definition of a religious
or charitable institution."); Henley v. City of Youngstown Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 735
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ment as a solid basis for providing housing for the homeless, a religious
organization must establish that such conduct is an act of religious faith
and worship.' 4 Evidence to that effect can appear in many forms, includ-
ing speeches, resolutions, papers, documents, pronouncements, mission
statements and minutes of the religious organization's meetings. Such ev-
idence should be sufficent to rebut any speculation that the religious justi-
fication was fabricated post factum.15 Then, as soon as practicable, a
permit, permission or variance should be sought from the local govern-
ment, in order to determine if legal action will be needed at all. It may be
that a compromise can be reached in order to avoid any lawsuit.
If legal action is needed to enforce the right to provide housing and
similar services for the homeless, an important consideration is the stan-
dard of review the case will receive in the judicial system. The question
of whether a zoning rule or ordinance allows a proposed use of land is
generally regarded as a question of law rather than one of fact, since it
involves judicial interpretation of the zoning ordinance as a legal docu-
ment. 16 Thus, because the judge decides the matter at a summary judg-
ment proceeding or after a bench trial, the case may never be presented
to a jury.
A religious organization that ministers to the homeless as part of its
exercise of religion would be denied its protected right under the First
Amendment's free exercise clause if it were prohibited from conducting
that religious ministry. 7 That is important because, "the loss of First
Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably
constitutes irreparable injury."' 8 Thus, in Stuart Circle Parish v. Board of
Zoning Appeals, 9 the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia held that a zoning ordinance, which limited the feeding
N.E.2d 433 (Ohio 2000) (holding that providing transitional apartments for homeless wo-
men and their children in former convent on church property was a religious use of the
property permitted by the zoning regulations, although the court did not decide the case on
constitutional grounds); Solid Rock Ministries Int'l v. Monroe Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 740
N.E.2d 320, 328 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the church facility to house unwed
pregnant teenagers was "an integral part of [the church's] Christian and missionary pur-
poses..."), appeal dismissed, 736 N.E.2d 901 (Ohio 2000).
14. See Capital City Rescue Mission, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
15. Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 235 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1196-
97 (D. Wyo. 2002) (holding that such evidence existed as to create issues of material fact as
to the religious purposes of a proposed day care center).
16. Cmty. Synagogue v. Bates, 136 N.E.2d 488, 492 (N.Y. 1956).
17. See Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church, 293 F.3d at 574 ("[T]he city concedes that the
Church's provision of services to the homeless falls within the ambit of protected activity
under the Free Exercise Clause...").
18. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976).
19. Stuart Circle Parish v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 946 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Va. 1996).
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and housing of the homeless within churches for no more than seven days
between October and April, violated the congregation's First Amend-
ment right to engage in its ministry to the homeless. 20 Likewise, in West-
ern Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment,21 the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia concluded that a
church's program for feeding the poor was religious conduct, and thus
enjoined the application of zoning regulations that purported to bar the
church from feeding homeless persons on its premises.22
In St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Hoboken,23 a
church sought,.,and obtained, an injunction restraining a municipality
from using its zoning laws to prohibit the operation of a shelter for the
homeless on church premises. 24 The superior court granting the injunc-
tion observed that regardless of how the zoning ordinance was construed,
"a municipality may not exercise its zoning power in violation of the fun-
damental tenets of the First Amendment."25 The court further explained
that:
Under the First Amendment, government must be neutral toward
religion. Government may breach that neutrality if it denies or un-
reasonably limits the religious use of land. It is indeed late in the day
for government to interfere with religion. Pilgrims and others who
fled to this country in order to pursue their religious beliefs where
and how they wished, undoubtedly thought they had ended govern-
ment intrusion on religious liberty.26
The court concluded: "[in view of the centuries old church tradition of
sanctuary for those in need of shelter and aid, St. John's and its parishio-
ners in sheltering the homeless are engaging in the free exercise of relig-
ion. [The City of] Hoboken cannot constitutionally use its zoning
authority to prohibit that free exercise. '"27
In Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church v. City of New York,28 a church
sued New York City seeking "injunctive relief preventing the City from
entering onto Church property and dispersing the homeless., 29 The
20. Id. at 1239.
21. W. Presbyterian Church v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 862 F. Supp. 538 (D.D.C.
1994).
22. Id. at 547.
23. St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Hoboken, 479 A.2d 935 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983).
24. Id. at 939.
25. Id. at 938.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church, 293 F.3d 570.
29. Id. at 573.
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church alleged a number of theories to support its request for an injunc-
tion, but the central point was that providing the homeless with even such
an attenuated form of shelter was a type of religious worship protected by
the First Amendment.3" The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
accepted that premise and held that "the City has not sufficiently shown
the existence of a relevant law or policy that is neutral and of general
applicability, and that would therefore justify its actions in dispersing the
homeless from the Church's landings and steps."31 As a result, the
church's First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion
prevailed.32
The difficulty is that there are factually similar cases with contrary
holdings. For instance, in First Assembly of God v. Collier County Flor-
ida,33 a church and the residents of a homeless shelter on the church
premises sued a county, challenging enforcement of zoning regulations
that had closed the shelter.34 The trial court granted summary judgment
for the county,35 which the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed. The Eleventh Circuit held that the county's enforcement of
neutral ordinances of general applicability36 did not violate the free exer-
cise clause of the First Amendment,37 despite the plain fact that such a
ruling necessarily prevented members of this church from freely practic-
ing their religion through this form of ministry.38 It is hard to reconcile a
governmental prohibition on worship in certain, common geographical
areas with the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
II. LAWS OF NEUTRAL AND GENERAL APPLICABILITY
While it was not a religious housing case, the Supreme Court's decision
in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah3 9 still set a chal-
lenging standard for avoiding the impact of land use statutes and regula-
tions on religious institutions attempting to provide housing for the
homeless.4" The Court's analysis in Lukumi Babalu Aye may be used to
impose severe restrictions on the use of the First Amendment to prevent
30. See id.
31. Id. at 576.
32. See id.
33. First Assembly of God v. Collier County, 20 F.3d 419 (11th Cir. 1994).
34. Id. at 420-21.
35. Id. at 421.
36. Id. at 423.
37. Id. at 424.
38. First Assembly of God, 20 F.3d at 424.
39. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
40. Id. at 531-32 (holding that city ordinances that are not neutral and of general ap-
plicability are unconstitutional).
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government regulation of religiously based housing for the homeless. In
Lukumi Babalu Aye, the Supreme Court held that a local law targeting
and barring the use of animal sacrifice for religious purposes violated the
Free Exercise Clause.4 In so holding, the Court reversed an Eleventh
Circuit opinion that had affirmed the district court's upholding of the lo-
cal ordinance.42
However, the Lukumi Babalu Aye Court also held that "a law that is
neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling
governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burden-
ing a particular religious practice."43 A law that does not meet these re-
quirements, however, "must be justified by a compelling governmental
interest, and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest."" Thus,
the Supreme Court made it clear that the two important threshold ques-
tions for a law challenged under the Free Exercise Clause are: (1) Is the
law neutral; and (2) Is the law of general applicability?45
The Court addressed these questions in Lukumi Babalu Aye, and de-
termined the ordinances were enacted only when government officials
belatedly realized that "Santerians" - believers in certain forms of animal
sacrifice4 6 - were planning to build a church in their community.47 The
ordinances explicitly targeted the religious conduct of animal sacrifice,
and so were not neutral.48 In addition, the Court found that the laws
were not of general applicability, but rather applied "only against conduct
motivated by religious belief."'49 Thus, the zoning ordinance in Lukumi
Babalu had to withstand strict judicial scrutiny - a stringent analysis that
it could not survive. 5' Likewise, in Daytona Rescue Mission, Inc. v. City
of Daytona Beach,5 a church attempted to obtain a permit to operate a
food bank and homeless shelter under a city zoning code. 52 The permit
was denied and the church filed suit alleging that members of the church
had been denied the right to the free exercise of religion.53 The district
41. Id. at 547.
42. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467 (S.D. Fla.
1989), affd, 936 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
43. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 531.
44. Id. at 531-32.
45. Id. at 531.
46. Id. at 524.
47. Id. at 526.
48. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 545.
49. Id. at 542.
50. Id. at 546.
51. Daytona Rescue Mission, Inc. v. City of Daytona Beach, 885 F. Supp. 1554 (M.D.
Fla. 1995).




court disagreed, holding: (1) the city's zoning code regulated conduct and
not belief;54 (2) the zoning code was not aimed at impeding religion;55 (3)
the government's interest in regulating zoning outweighed housing the
homeless and feeding the poor, even if that was a religious practice;56 and
(4) the city had a compelling interest in regulating homeless shelters and
food banks, which were being furthered by the least restrictive means
possible. 7
III. THE RELIGIOUS LAND USE ACT
The Religious Land Use Act was Congress's solution to the highly-re-
strictive view that some courts had taken of the First Amendment, espe-
cially when there was a conflict between religious practices involving the
use of land and supposedly neutral laws of general applicability. Presi-
dent Bill Clinton signed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act into law on September 22, 2000.58 Congress enacted this law
after the United States Supreme Court invalidated parts of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993."9 Congress passed the Religious Land
Use Act to "remedy the well documented discriminatory and abusive
treatment suffered by religious individuals and organizations in the land
use context."6 ° Congressional action was controlling because Article VI,
Clause 2 of the United States Constitution makes federal law the su-
preme law of the land.61 As a consequence of the Supremacy Clause,
Congress could sidestep local government disapproval of religious use of
land in a number of contexts, including providing services and housing for
the homeless. 2
54. Id. at 1558.
55. Id.
56. See Daytona Rescue Mission, Inc., 885 F. Supp at 1560.
57. Id.
58. See generally John J. Dvorske, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Operation
of Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 181 A.L.R. FED. 247
(2002); Shawn Jensvold, Article, The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
of 2000 (RLUIPA): A Valid Exercise of Congressional Power?, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 1 (2001);
Frank T. Santoro, Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act, 24 WHITTER L. REV. 493 (2002); Roman P. Storzer &
Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of
2000: A Constitutional Response to Unconstitutional Zoning Practices, 9 GEo. MASON L.
REV. 929 (2001).
59. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
60. 146 CONG REC. E 1234, 1235 (daily ed. July 13, 2000) (statement of Rep. Charles
T. Canady).
61. U.S. CONST. art. VI, C1.2.
62. Derek L. Gaubatz, RLUIPA at Four: Evaluating the Success and Constitutionality
of RLUIPA's Prisoner Provisions, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 501, 598 (2005).
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As a result, if the Religious Land Use Act is constitutional, local land
use and zoning regulations not conforming with its terms would necessa-
rily be invalid and of no force or effect. The Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution thus makes the Religious Land Use Act a po-
tentially powerful law that could provide religious organizations a real
opportunity to place shelters, short-term housing, and long-term residen-
tial structures for the homeless in locations where such facilities do the
most good, which is often where local land use planners and zoning offi-
cials do not want to see them located.63
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RLUIPA
Several local governments have already challenged the constitutional-
ity of the Religious Land Use Act, contending that its enactment was
beyond the scope of congressional authority.' The influential United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has upheld its constitution-
ality.6 5 Indeed, the majority of courts that have considered the matter
have concluded that the Religious Land Use Act is on its face
constitutional.6 6
Still, many commentators are convinced that prohibiting the govern-
ment from having the ability to force religious institutions to use their
land in ways that conflict with their religious beliefs actually promotes
religion, violates the separation of church and state, exceeds congres-
sional authority, contravenes the United States Constitution, or is simply
an unworkable and unwise piece of legislation.6 7 If the Religious Land
63. Diane K. Hook, Comment, The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act of 2000: Congress's New Twist on "Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick," 34 URB. LAW.
829, 835 (2002) ("[T]he act may provide religious institutions and individuals engaged in
religious activities with a powerful weapon to challenge land-use impediments, and per-
haps, at the same time, the Act has taken away any meaningful power of local communities
to regulate land use within their borders.").
64. Benning v. Georgia, 391 F.3d 1299, 1309 (11th Cir. 2004); Charles v. Verhagen, 348
F.3d 601, 610 (7th Cir. 2003); Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2002).
65. See Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at 1070 ("We hold that Congress did not exceed its
Spending Clause power in enacting RLUIPA.").
66. See, e.g., Benning, 391 F.3d at 1309; Charles, 348 F.3d at 610. But see Elsinore
Christian Ctr. v. City of Lake Elsinore, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (finding
the Religious Land Use Act exceeded congressional power).
67. See, e.g., Joshua R. Geller, The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act of 2000: An Unconstitutional Exercise of Congress's Power Under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y. 561 (2002-2003); Marci A. Ham-
ilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311 (2003); Ada-Marie Walsh, Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: Unconstitutional and Unnecessary, 10 WM. &
MARY BILL RTs. J. 189 (2001).
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Use Act can continue to withstand such attacks, it will be a powerful
mechanism for securing viable housing for the homeless.
V. RLUIPA's "SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN" CLAUSE
The heart of the Religious Land Use Act is a ban on land use laws and
regulations that place a substantial burden on the free exercise of
religion:
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a
manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of
a person, including a religious assembly or institution, unless the gov-
ernment demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person,
assembly, or institution -
(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling gov-
ernmental interest.6 8
It is clear that RLUIPA's placement of the "substantial burden" on the
government is intended to negate the reasoning of such cases as Lukumi
Babalu Aye, where the Supreme Court held that "a law that is neutral and
of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmen-
tal interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particu-
lar religious practice."'69 Now, under RLUIPA, it is the government -
and not the religious institution - that must establish that land use regula-
tions imposing substantial burdens on religious exercise further a compel-
ling governmental interest and are the least restrictive means of
furthering that interest.7
0
The "substantial burden" language has been the focal point of many
cases construing the Religious Land Use Act.7 ' However, the Seventh
Circuit has concluded that, as used in RLUIPA, a "substantial burden on
68. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
The mandated strict scrutiny part of this law has met with some opposition from legal
commentators, although not from the courts. See Caroline R. Adams, The Constitutional
Validity of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: Will
RLUIPA's Strict Scrutiny Survive the Supreme Court's Strict Scrutiny?, 70 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2361 (2002); Kris Banvard, Exercise in Frustration? A New Attempt by Congress to
Restore Strict Scrutiny to Governmental Burdens on Religious Practice, 31 CAP. U.L. REV.
279 (2003).
69. See Church of the Lukumi Babali Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1).
71. Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism,
Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 100 Fed. Appx. 70, 77 (3rd Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct.
1061 (2005); Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 568 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct.
2549 (2005); San Jose Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th
Cir. 2004); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004),
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religious exercise is one that necessarily bears direct, primary, and funda-
mental responsibility for rendering religious exercise. . . effectively im-
practicable., 7 2 In order to show that state regulation of land has created
a substantial burden on the exercise of religion, the religious institution is
not required to demonstrate that there is no other land available that
might fulfill its purposes.7 3 A substantial burden exists if the religious
institution would have to endure additional delay, uncertainty and ex-
pense in order to find suitable substitute property for its religious pur-
poses, or have to restart the permit process to satisfy the zoning
authorities.74 The important point is that a religious institution need not
prove that it has nowhere else to practice its religious tenets, just that the
government has improperly imposed a substantial burden on the religious
institution's choice of a location to perform its worship.75
Land use regulations that would otherwise prevent religious organiza-
tions from providing housing facilities and services to the homeless
should be subjected to the substantial burden test because such regula-
tions cripple the free exercise of religion. After all, when providing hous-
ing for the homeless, there are few ideal places to house such persons, in
a location that is reasonably safe, well-maintained, affordable, and close
to those educational, governmental and private resources that such per-
sons need to live and improve their existence.76
Moreover, the "substantial burden" language must be read in conjunc-
tion with another provision of the Religious Land Use Act stating that
"no government shall impose or implement a land use regulation that...
unreasonably limits religious assemblies, institutions, or structures within
a jurisdiction."77 Religious housing facilities for the homeless clearly
qualify as "religious institutions, or structures." Indeed, Congress has
specified that the Religious Land Use Act is to be interpreted and con-
strued strongly in favor of the religious entity: "This [Act] shall be con-
strued in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the
cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1295 (2005); Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago,
342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1096 (2004).
72. See Civil Liberties for Urban Believers, 342 F.3d at 761.
73. Sts. Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v. City of New Berlin, 396
F.3d 895, 901 (7th Cir. 2005).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See GOTTFRIED, supra note 3; HOMELESSNESS: A GUIDE To THE LITERATURE,
supra note 3; KUSMER, supra note 3; Rossi, supra note 3.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(3)(B) (2000).
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maximum extent permitted by the terms of this [Act] and the
Constitution. "78
Of even greater importance, the Religious Land Use Act specifically
envisions the application of the Act to advance claims against the govern-
ment or to defend against the government:
"A person may assert a violation of this [Act] as a claim or defense
in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a
government. ,79
This clause provides a religious institution with solid standing for filing
suitable actions, and for defending against actions brought by the
government.
VI. HOUSING AS AN AcT OF RELIGIOUS FAITH UNDER RLUIPA
As noted earlier, courts have repeatedly recognized that providing
housing and services for the homeless constitutes a form of religious ac-
tivity protected to a certain extent by the First Amendment.8 ° For its
part, the Religious Land Use Act defines the term "religious exercise" in
a broad, highly inclusive fashion:
Religious exercise. -
(A)In general. - The term "religious exercise" includes any exer-
cise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a sys-
tem of religious belief.
(B)Rule. - The use, building, or conversion of real property for
the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered to be religious
exercise of the person or entity that uses or intends to use the
property for that purpose. 81
This broad definition of religious exercise fully harmonizes with federal
and state common law and constitutional law. As the United States Su-
preme Court has similarly remarked, "it is no business of courts to say
that what is a religious practice or activity for one group is not religion
under the protection of the First Amendment."8 2 As a rule, courts will
accept claims of religious belief unless they are "so bizarre, so clearly
nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection under the
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g) (2000); see also Kang v. U. Lim Am., Inc., 296 F.3d 810,
816 (9th Cir. 2002) ("We broadly interpret ambiguous language in civil rights statutes to
effectuate the remedial purpose of the legislation.").
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a) (2000).
80. See Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, 293 F.3d 570, 575 (2d Cir.
2002); Stuart Circle Parish v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 946 F. Supp. 1225, 1236 (E.D. Va.
1996); Henley v. Youngstown Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 735 N.E.2d 433, 439 (Ohio 2000).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7) (2000).
82. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953).
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Free Exercise Clause.",83 After all, religion "is what the individual human
being perceives to be the requirement of the transhuman [sic] Spirit to
whom he or she gives allegiance."84 It is "not within the judicial ken to
question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith or the
validity of particular litigants' interpretations of those creeds."85 In fact,
even the very architecture of a building can constitute a form of religious
exercise.86
The legislative history of the Religious Land Use Act exhibits an inten-
tion to include a wide array of religious exercises and activities that in-
volve the use of land.87 The drafters of this law intended to ensure that
religious entities could operate "homeless shelters in suburbs" and similar
facilities providing food, housing and other services for the poor.88 Pro-
viding housing for the homeless, as a religious exercise, fits squarely
within RLUIPA.
VII. RELIGIOUs HOUsING UPHELD UNDER RLUIPA
Since its enactment, the majority of courts have been sympathetic to-
ward the Religious Land Use Act in cases involving temporary shelter
and other forms of housing for the homeless.8 9 In these courts' opinions,
the Religious Land Use Act has emerged as a powerful tool for establish-
ing religious use to create such housing in property that could otherwise
not be used for such purposes.90 For instance, in 2002, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld an injunction prohibiting the City
of New York from dispersing homeless persons that a church had allowed
to sleep on the church's outdoor property, in part based on RLUIPA.91
The Second Circuit accepted the church's position that this assistance for
83. Scott v. Rosenberg, 702 F.2d 1263, 1273 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting Thomas v. Re-
view Bd. of the Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981)).
84. Peterson v. Minidoka County Sch. Dist. No. 331, 118 F.3d 1351, 1357 (9th Cir.
1997), amended by, 1997 US. App LEXIS 36357, 13 (9th Cir. 1997).
85. See Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989).
86. Martin v. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter
Day Saints, 747 N.E.2d 131, 137-38 (Mass. 2001).
87. See James L. Noles, Jr., Can Historic Preservation Coexist with Protections for Re-
ligious Land Uses?, 17 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 89 (2002) (arguing the Religious Land
Use Act is so broad and strong that it may override zoning ordinances meant to preserve
historic structures and districts).
88. See 146 CONG. REc. E 1564, 1564 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2000) (statement of Rep.
Henry J. Hyde).
89. See generally, Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, 293 F.3d 570
(2d Cir. 2002); First Assembly of God v. Collier County, 20 F.3d 419 (11th Cir. 1994).
90. See generally, Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church, 293 F.3d 570; First Assembly of God,
20 F.3d 419.
91. See Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church, 293 F.3d at 572.
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the homeless was "an integral part of its religious mission"92 and that the
church was "commanded by scripture to care for the least, the lost, and
the lonely of this world, and, in ministering to the homeless, the Church
[was] giving the love of God. There is perhaps no higher act of worship
for a Christian.,
93
The holding in Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne,94
may stand for the argument that a church might establish a claim under
the Religious Land Use Act to require a city to permit operation of a
religious day care facility in a low-density residential neighborhood where
such a facility would otherwise have been banned.95 In Dilaura v. Ann
Arbor Charter Township,9 6 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held that a religious organization was entitled to allege that
the Religious Land Use Act permitted it to use its property as a religious
retreat, despite a contrary zoning ordinance.97
In Shepherd Montessori Center Milan v. Ann Arbor Charter Town-
ship,98 the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the Religious Land Use
Act might provide a basis for relief for people who wanted to open and
operate a religious primary school for children, despite a local ordinance
that the only proper use for the land was as an office park.99 In Konikov
v. Orange County, Florida, °° the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the county was not entitled to summary judgment against a rabbi
who was conducting religious meetings and services at his home, in defi-
ance of county ordinances, because the lack of rational, even-handed en-
forcement standards had created a risk of arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.' °' While some cases indicate otherwise, the majority trend
favors enforcing the RLUIPA's plain terms, thereby affording greater
protection to religious organizations seeking to use land for religious pur-
poses in areas restricted by adverse regulations and laws.
92. Id. at 574.
93. Id. at 574-75 (internal quotes and ellipses omitted).
94. Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 235 F. Supp. 2d 1186 (D.
Wyo. 2002).
95. Id. at 1196-98.
96. Dilaura v. Ann Arbor Charter Twp., 30 Fed. Appx. 501 (6th Cir. 2002).
97. Id. at 507, 510.
98. Shepard Montessori Ctr. Milan v. Ann Arbor Charter Twp., 675 N.W. 2d 271
(Mich. Ct. App. 2003).
99. Id. at 289-90.
100. Konikov v. Orange County, 410 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2005).
101. Id. at 1330-31.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutional-
ized Persons Act provide powerful tools for protecting the rights of relig-
ious institutions to supply housing for the homeless as a part of the
exercise of their religious beliefs. This benefits both the persons who can
freely exercise their ministry of care as well as those less fortunate and
the homeless who receive lodging and other essential services at locations
that are convenient. Indeed, since religious non-profit organizations have
the desire and potential to provide substantial services to the homeless in
an era where government lacks the will and resources to do so, the nation
as a whole will clearly benefit from their charitable housing activities, ini-
tiated under the aegis of the First Amendment and the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act.

